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Yvonne Howell

Baring the Brain As Well As The Soul:
Milan Kundera’s The Joke

I

M

ilan Kundera’s first major novel, The Joke, was written in
1961–1965, before he made the decision to leave Czechoslovakia
and take up residency as a political exile in France.1 With a few noteworthy exceptions, critics of the work focused on its political message
in a Cold War context. This was easy to do: its plot revolves around an
avid young Czech communist (Ludvik), who writes an ironic postcard
to his overly earnest girlfriend while she is away at a political training
camp. The year is 1950, and among intellectuals, enthusiasm for a new
era of Soviet-mediated socialism is a genuine response to the chaotic
disintegration of old certainties after the Nazi occupation of the country. Ludvik is dedicated to the cause of communism, but he also wants
to get laid. In response to his girlfriend’s ingenuous letters about the
“healthy optimism” of camp life, he quips on a postcard, “Optimism is the
opium of the people! A healthy atmosphere stinks of stupidity! Long live Trotsky!
Ludvik” (p. 34).
The repercussions are swift and serious. Ludvik loses his Party membership and is expelled from the university. As a non-student with a political
strike on his record, he cannot defer military duty, and is assigned to
a unit of blacklisted conscripts to two years of hard labor in the mines
outside of Ostrava (a provincial town in Moravia). Ludvik’s trauma is
the trauma of countless participants in the cannibalistic logic of Stalinism: at first he believes in the Party and is genuinely dismayed to find
his identity as a member of the vanguard group forcibly exchanged for
a new identity as social outcast and “enemy of the people.” He quickly
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looses his former communist convictions, but this does not mitigate the
sheer physical trauma of brutal army conditions and the irretrievable
loss of youth.
In this bleak breaking point of his life, Ludvik finds salvation in his
sudden and all-consuming love for an ordinary local girl he coincidentally encounters during one of his rare Sunday afternoon leaves. In
Kundera’s handling, the moment of falling in love is described as an
instance of our implacable urge to ascribe meaning and intention to
random events: “A great deal has been said about love at first sight; I
am perfectly aware of love’s retrospective tendency to make a legend
of itself, turn its beginnings into a myth; so I don’t want to assert that
it was love; but I have no doubt there was some kind of clairvoyance at
work” (p. 66). Instead of a psychologically nuanced rendering of budding romance (as perhaps Tolstoy would have given us), we get a dissection of the cognitive mechanism that irrationally attributes clairvoyance
(the universe “knows” something) to the encounter with the object of
infatuation. For her part, the girl Lucie seems happy for the friendship
of this embittered conscript, but as soon as he tries to move their relationship past the kissing stage to actual coitus, she resists desperately.
He assumes she is a virgin and that her resistance is a pointless combination of fear and modesty. In a moment of overwhelming frustration,
he breaks off with her and she disappears from his life until a chance
encounter fifteen years later.
The three other characters that share Ludvik’s generational trauma
are neither mute, nor mysterious in their attributions of meaning to
the botched course of their lives. All of them initially supported the
communist take-over of Czechoslovakia in 1948. All of them willingly
participated in the construction of an ideological regime that soon
revealed its intolerance of any doubt, ambiguity, alternative thinking,
or creative opposition. In the name of creating an utopian state “for
the workers by the workers,” the Czechoslovak Communists arrested or
expelled from their jobs hundreds of so-called “bourgeois sympathizers”
(intellectuals and entrepreneurs of various stripes); it staged spectacular
show trials and executed its critics; and gradually, it leveled public discourse to a steady cant of conformist rhetoric and practice. When the
lives of all four narrators intersect in 1965, each of them must look into
a chasm that separates former illusions and crimes of conscience from
the present-day exigencies of getting on with life in a new, less ideological era. The basic problematic is at once utterly simple and ubiquitous,
yet perennially unsolvable: after any trauma (personal or generational),
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what can be forgotten, and what can be revenged or redressed? The Joke
poses an ethical challenge to find and depict a space between the poles
of historical amnesia (silence and forgetting) and collective vengeance
(former victims reenact the violence of their oppressors, in reverse).
In his non-fictional essays, Kundera has already suggested what kind
of art is best equipped to show us the way towards a space that neither
forgets trauma, nor reenacts it. In 1983, Kundera contributed an essay
on the Czech composer Janacek to an émigré publication, Cross Currents:
A Journal of Central European Culture.2 In the article, he is particularly
interested in Janacek’s last opera, an adaptation of Dostoevsky’s novel
about life in a Siberian prison camp. Kundera finds that “when invested
with the modern hyper-sensitivity of his music, it [House of the Dead]
becomes the image of today’s concentration camp” (CC, p. 377). The
essay asks “How is it possible that Janacek’s final work, his musical last
testament—he died the same year—was a vision of the hell of today?
Why was he interested in a situation that had no perceptible link with
his personal experiences? Was it from the night of the future that it had
come to him?” (CC, p. 377). In other words, Kundera applauds Janacek’s
proleptic vision—his music shows us the future that will inevitably be
reenacted if we willfully forget the past.
Janacek’s ability to “predict the future” is explained as a function of
his disturbingly polyrhythmic and polyphonic style. Kundera’s analysis of
Janacek’s difficult aesthetic structures vindicates the staging of multiple
voices and perspectives in art (no matter how jarring to the reader’s/
listener’s sensibilities). When the voices of Janacek’s songs “intermingle,
interlace and mesh in a fascinating polyrhythm,” the listener gets the
“impression of hearing wild cries from the crowd, each person shouting
his truth without listening to the other. This is neither homophony nor
counterpoint. It is the inimitable polyphony of expressions” (CC, p. 376). We
can assume, in consonance with the above analysis of Janacek’s music,
that Kundera also intended to write a novel of polyphonic expressions in
order to invoke the proleptic dimension of art—to show that the past
already looms in the future, which then reaches its tentacles back into
the present.
Earlier critics of the novel were understandably more attuned to the
“tumultuous present of myth-destruction” (Dolezel, p. 125) represented
in The Joke than adumbrations of the moral conundrums that persist in
an era of globalization.3 However, if some texts are capable of warning
us against a (bad) future before it happens, it is valuable to have modes
of interpretation that illuminate this function. The great contribution
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of the Russian Formalists and the Prague Structuralists was to insist on
the internal, autonomous coherence of artistic works, rather than derive
their meaning from external social, political, or psychological contexts.
Paradoxically, the anti-Marxist thrust of the Structuralist argument
automatically politicized the whole business of literature and literary
criticism in Soviet bloc countries. As an astute insider writing from the
outside, émigré critic Peter Steiner was able to mine this paradox and
reconnect aesthetic and social context in interesting ways.4 For instance,
Steiner discovers in Havel’s absurdist plays of the 1960s a “communicating about a communicative disorder” (Steiner, p. 11) and then shows
how Havel’s ostensibly far-from-political scripts allowed a generation of
Czechoslovak viewers to apprehend (and possibly rebel against) their
own participation in a system of pervasive double-speak (Steiner, pp.
218–40).
Steiner’s approach inspires me to see the critic of Soviet-era literary
dynamics in a triple-bind: a) he is only interested in texts that purposely
foreground aesthetic considerations over ideological ones; and in the
same vein b) he flouts official “Marxist” injunctions to treat the text
as a reflection of social relations, and insists on analyzing the internal,
autonomous organization of a given text; leading to c) an ostensibly
apolitical approach reveals to him the “secret” of a given text’s explosive political impact in this particular society. Following Steiner’s lead,
I want to incorporate cognitive and evolutionary data into re-readings
of East European novels, because for all its contested “trendiness,” this
data actually reaffirms the productive and insightful approach to literary
systems and culture pioneered by the Prague Structuralists. Furthermore,
a mode of interpretation that helps illuminate the underlying cognitive
structures of myth-making strikes me as particularly useful in the post-Cold
War context. It is not enough to explain to my students that behind the
Iron Curtain, people succumbed to this-and-that ideological myth and
later regretted it. This ends up being a way of out-sourcing guilt to the
past, without taking into account our role in the future.
Kundera attributes to his favorite composer an intention to strip away
“metrical clichés” and “romantic flourishes” in order to lay bare “the hidden dimension of people, of words, of situations” (CC, p. 377). In 1965,
Kundera was already writing against the metrical clichés and romantic
flourishes that embodied the emotional appeal of Communism. I will
cite just one passage out of dozens to show how the Party’s invocations
of harmony, homeland, and heroism are systematically re-contextualized
and dismantled under Kundera’s scrutiny. For instance, here the lyrical
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appeal of children licking strawberry soft-serve cones is re-inscribed as
a parody of the uplifting symbol (torch) of Revolutionary fervor:
Again I passed people carrying little red-capped cones, and again I thought
that the cones looked like torches, and that there might be some meaning in their shape, because those torches were not torches, but parodies
of torches, and the pink trace of pleasure they so solemnly displayed was
not pleasure but a parody of pleasure, which would seem to capture the
inescapably parodic nature of all torches and pleasures in this dusty little
town. (p. 166)

But it was not enough to demolish socialist realist facades; Kundera
needed to find a way to lay bare the “hidden dimension of people,
words, situations.” This aesthetic task required an existential analysis,
i.e., an examination of what makes people tick that is broad enough
to implicate all of humanity, but deep enough to reflect the peculiar
influence of a given historical moment. In what follows, I will argue that
two current theories about how our minds ascribe intentional psychological states to other people (so-called Theory of Mind) as well as to
non-personal events that happen to us (a proposed Existential Theory
of Mind) provide a rich interpretive framework for understanding the
social and historical context of Kundera’s innovative aesthetics.

II
First of all, in The Joke and other early works (e.g., the short story
collection Laughable Loves), readers are confronted with an unfamiliar
blend of erotic subject matter and cerebral analyses of how the would-be
lovers assess each other’s unspoken intentions. We do not get to watch
Ludvik’s expert seduction of the married Helena in order to make
our own inferences about how he reads her and she reads him (as we
might “watch and infer” the thoughts of Turgenev’s characters). Instead,
Ludvik’s theory of how to predict and manipulate Helena’s desires is
made clinically explicit: “The management of a woman’s mind has its
own inexorable rules . . . it is much wiser to grasp her basic self image
(her basic principles, ideals, convictions) and contrive to establish (with
the aid of sophistry, illogical demagoguery, and the like) a harmonious
relationship between that self-image and the desired conduct on her
part” (Joke, p. 181). One of the most striking things about Ludvik’s narration is the way he relentlessly exposes the cognitive steps by which
one character infers the motivations of another.5
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Cognitive psychologists have a model of human inferential capacities
in regard to the behavior of other people, known as the Theory of Mind
(ToM).6 In a nutshell, our “theory” of how other people’s minds work
is a constant, automatic, everyday facet of our mental functioning. We
regularly attribute unobservable intentions to other people’s observed
behaviors. Therefore, if I observe you as you cross your legs and roll
your eyes while reading this, I attribute a state of mind to your behavior.
I might ascribe to your behavior a mental state such as boredom, or
creeping incredulity that this topic is being pursued in this journal, and
so forth. It is easy to see how the ability to read intentionality (some
kind of mental stance) in the observed behavior of those around us
would be a highly adaptive trait, one that was vigorously selected for in
the course of human evolution. Our ancestors thrived when they were
able to discern in a glance or a movement the likelihood of a neighbor’s
cooperation, courage, or intent to deceive.
When we read novels, we habitually transfer our almost nonstop
penchant for mindreading to the task of figuring out social relationships in a fictional world. To answer the question of why we read fiction,
Lisa Zunshine argued that at least two highly adaptive features of our
mental architecture—our “Theory of Mind” and our meta-representational abilities—are given a good workout when they enter a fictional
playground full of social intrigue (e.g., the nineteenth-century comedy
of manners), complex characters (e.g., revealing themselves in streamof-consciousness), or multi-layered attributions of guilt (e.g., detective
fiction).7 To put it very succinctly, the mind on fiction busies itself
with deciphering the plausible emotions and intentions signaled by
a character’s behavior, and when necessary, it eagerly delves into the
meta-representational task of deciphering nested layers of intentionality:
Anna lowers her black lashes and narrows her eyes [behavior] because
Vronsky’s inappropriate adoration makes her feel both guilty and triumphant [inferred mental state 1], but she wants to deny that she feels
either guilt or triumph [inferred mental state 2], and she knows [first
layer of representation] that Kitty knows [second layer of representation]
that her denial is false. I insert this example to show that invoking the
relevance of ToM to our reading of fictional texts highlights both the
complexity and the surprising naturalness of our ability to translate a
simple “Anna’s lowered gaze” into an ominous knot of passionate and
duplicitous feelings.
Now we can see that Kundera intends to “make strange” the very
naturalness of our ToM, by diverting our expectations for a mindread-
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ing romp through the complicated, erotically charged social milieu he
depicts. We are diverted towards an awareness that powerful social and
political ideologies intersect with “normal” ToM functioning in ways that
are probably historically and culturally specific. As many interpreters
of the Soviet period have pointed out, the actual implementation of
socialism as cultural practice involved a multi-layered system of coded
signs and behaviors on the part of both rulers and the ruled. Yurchak
characterizes the transition from Stalinist to post-Stalinist culture as a
process of disconnecting (and realigning) what was actually said (the
“constative” function of authoritative discourse) from what was actually meant (the increasingly negotiable “performative” function of this
discourse).8 In this ambiguously controlled but potentially repressive
environment, the relationship between “observed actions” (she raised
her hand at a Party meeting to vote ‘yes’) and “unobservable intentions”
(this was not a signal that she believes in communism, but a signal that
she knows that we know that she doesn’t, but we will pretend that she
knows that we know she is willing to play the game as the system requires,
etc.) was a matter of great political and personal import, so that a kind
of “folk expertise” on the dynamics of mind reading was implicit in the
local culture. In The Joke, Kundera’s sharp portrayal of how characters
read (or misread) each other’s behavior should be read as a sustained
comment on the social pathology engendered by the Czech response
to Soviet occupation.
Put another way, Kundera is not always interested in affording us
the pleasure of “mindreading” his characters. Instead of sketching the
contours of their behaviors and allowing us to infer their probable states
of mind, he makes a parody of the whole connection between observed
actions and unobserved states of mind. For instance, when his narrator
Ludvig stumbles into a secular Christening ceremony at the local town
hall, he details the muscular efforts that produce a woman’s smile, so
that one new mother “stared up at the ceiling, then her eyes fell and
met the glance of someone in the audience; the glance so ruffled her
that she tore her eyes away and smiled, but the smile (the effort of the
smile) quickly vanished, leaving only a rigid configuration of the lips”
(Joke, p. 169). This mode of description, complete with an italicized
parenthetical analysis of the non-smile’s unwilling origins, completely
co-opts the reader’s own ability to infer mental states from the micro
shifts in a character’s expression. In fact, Kundera’s narrator has offered
us the kind of description a well-programmed robot might produce.
It scans and records a sequence of small gestures and attributes some
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correct mental states to what it sees (ruffled, rigid). It completes the
activity of “mindreading” for us, in a way that is both discomforting
and unexpected in a novel that skirts with more familiar conventions
(adultery, revenge, small-town social life). The impression made by these
parodic passages is that the author has chosen to depict mainstream
small town life in his society as somehow autistic.
The theory of autism forwarded by Baron-Cohen and most of his
peers indicates that the problem of autism is fundamentally a “social
deficit” resulting from the mind’s inability to cope with fluid, complex,
unpredictable, or ambiguous systems (including almost all social behavior, conversation, fiction, emotional expression, etc.). The autistic mind
craves sameness, and finds comfort in systems that are lawful and predictable.9 What can it mean to say Kundera invokes an “autistic” society? By
this I do mean that he depicts autistic characters, but that as soon as an
author chooses (for whatever artistic reason) to sever the connection
between observed behavior and inferred state of mind (“normal” mind
reading at work), the resulting representation of human interactions
mimics the problem of autism. Czech society under Communist rule is
thus construed as a system that abhors ambiguity and unpredictability.
Vaclav Havel diagnosed the same symptoms in his famous 1978 essay
“The Power of the Powerless.”10 In his telling, the predictable complicity
of Czech citizens in the regime’s bankrupt public rituals can be attributed to the following calculations: “I, the greengrocer XY, live here
and I know what I must do. I behave in the manner expected of me. I
can be depended upon and am beyond reproach. I am obedient and
therefore I have the right to be left in peace” (Havel, p. 7). Obviously,
this risk-avoiding attitude has nothing to do with clinical autism (nor is
it specific to socialist societies!). On the contrary, Steiner characterizes
it as “schizophrenic” because the greengrocer pretends to be obedient
in public, whereas we all know that in private he can be scathing about
the hypocritical shortcomings of the regime.11
Drawing on Gregory Bateson’s theory of the “double-bind,” Steiner
diagnoses a problem people encounter when forced to respond to
utterances whose objective-linguistic meaning is the opposite of their
meta-linguistic meaning (Steiner, p. 10). Example: Let’s say children are
told to sing every day “Lenin’s Party is the people’s strength / leading
us to the triumph of Communism” (lyrics of the Soviet national anthem,
revised and adopted in 1977) by a Party whose members enjoy enormous
material benefits not available to 90% of the “people.” The singers will
eventually adopt a behavior that does and says and pretends to believe
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one thing in public, while venting other beliefs at home. My reading of
Kundera suggests that at least some Russian and East European writers
have portrayed the “double-bind” behavior as something more nuanced
(if you will) than schizophrenia. The public pretending-to-pretend-tobelieve behavior mimics the mental stance of Baron-Cohen’s autists, in so
far as the public self participates in official discourse as if that discourse
were indeed a rigidly predictable and unambiguous system of signs. The
private self reverses its mental stance and interprets (or over-interprets)
every gesture as potentially fraught with complex intentionality. Thus,
Baron-Cohen’s recent description of autism as an extreme point on the
range of cognitive preference for systematizing versus improvising may
also turn out to be a useful intellectual and discursive framework for
thinking about how modern societies effect individual behavior. People
are perfectly capable of pretending to be socially tone-deaf systematizers
in public, while operating as fully sensitive mindreaders in private.
The Joke’s depiction of Czech society in the aftermath of Stalinism
reveals that nobody can trust anybody; personal behavior has become
unmoored from internal belief systems, outward appearances have been
systematically co-opted from and alienated from natural expressions
of a subjective inner world. This interpretation is most dramatically
confirmed in the moment of Ludvik’s conviction by the court of his
peers, which he re-plays over and over again in his mind. Pre-trial, he
thought he could intuit a myriad of thoughts, emotions, and reactions
behind the outward behavior of his various friends and colleagues.
The moment of his conviction marks a turning point, after which he
expects ideological considerations to trump the “normal” inferences
generated by our instinctive mindreading. The fact that he censors the
more generous promptings of his astute ToM is figured as the cause of
his pointed alienation and bitterness long after he successfully returns to
civilian society. Fifteen years after his arrest, he still finds that “whenever
I make new acquaintances, men or women with the potential of becoming friends or lovers, I project them back into that time, that hall, and
ask myself whether they would have raised their hands; no one has ever
passed the test: every one of them has raised his hand in the same way
my former friends and colleagues (willingly or not, out of conviction
or fear) raised theirs” (Joke, p. 76).
Here’s the odd thing about Ludvik: our embittered, cynical ladies’
man has learned to censor or “correct” his ToM impressions of other
people, but he can’t seem to get rid of an irrepressible urge to ascribe
intentional psychological states to impersonal events, against all rational
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logic. This skeptical and disillusioned Czech intellectual suspects that
even those of us with existentialist leanings cannot help but discern
codes of meaning conveyed in the gestures of the universe:
For all my skepticism, some trace of irrational superstition did survive in
me, the strange conviction, for example, that everything in life that happens to me also has a sense, that it means something, that life speaks to us
about itself through its story, that it gradually reveals a secret, that it takes
the form of a rebus whose message must be deciphered, that the stories
we live comprise the mythology of our lives and in that mythology lies the
key to truth and mystery. Is it an illusion? Possibly, even probably, but I
can’t rid myself of the need continually to decipher my own life. (p. 164)

The fact that Kundera’s characters can discern the fine print of fate
(“whose message must be deciphered . . .”) even in the spiritually devastated landscape of their lives is so remarkable that the psychological
mechanism of attributing meaning and intentionality to the random events
of our lives becomes one of the novel’s primary thematic and structural
motifs.

III
As a group, readers of journals like this one tend to define themselves
as secular, critical thinkers. We claim to interpret the events that make
up our biographical experience without resorting to “hidden patterns”
revealed by folk beliefs, religious platitudes, or superstitious assumptions
about reality that cannot be plausibly investigated by scientific method.
We are smart skeptics who do not normally ascribe any intentionality
to the small coincidences of daily life; e.g., if a parking space opens up
just when I need it, I rationally believe that this occurrence (which saves
me a lot of time) is a random fluke of probability, not a coded message
from some disembodied Parking Spirit that I was meant to show up for
my meeting early. Note, however: if my prompt arrival coincides with a
sudden opportunity to take someone else’s spot in a life-transforming
project, I will find it hard not to ascribe benevolence or clairvoyance
to the force that gave me that parking space. In this sense, I am as
superstitious as Ludvik. As we have seen in the discussion of ToM, this
mode of thinking is not contested when we are dealing with agentical
subjects who might plausibly desire or intend a certain outcome. What
Daniel Dennett has described as “adopting the Intentional Stance” (as
opposed to seeking physical or design causality) allows us to explain
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the behavior of a system in terms of its likely intentional states (belief,
desires, hopes, fears, etc.), so it is obviously well suited to dealing with
most people and animals.12 But what are we to make of the urge to
ascribe intentionality to the universe?
One direction of current research postulates that somewhere along
the path to our modern selves, the inferential capacities implicated
so usefully in our mind reading capacity (ToM) extended to other
spheres of cognitive functioning.13 Is it possible that once we became
expert readers of other people’s behavior, we also become expert and
unstoppable readers of the behavior of the universe? In his article on
“The Existential Theory of Mind,” cognitive evolutionist Jesse Bering
reiterates that even when we believe that meaning is only generated
within the mind itself, it is hard to find a person who in practice does
not project some meaning-making agency onto an external, specified
(e.g., God) or vaguely disembodied psychological agent of some sort
(Bering, p. 5). The EToM hypothesized by cognitive psychologists may
or may not constitute a dedicated domain of the brain (not important
for our purposes), and it may or may not be particularly adaptive, if it
evolved as a spandrel of another, profoundly adaptive piece of mental
architecture. Nevertheless, so much of The Joke experiments with our
perception of EToM’s ubiquitous yet puzzling resilience. At both the
structural and stylistic levels, this novel plays with the tension between
our rational denial of fateful design and our almost irrepressible urge
to project intentionality onto the events that befall us.
Kundera’s representation of trauma, and the anxious space that hovers between forgetfulness and vengeance, is grounded in the careful,
hyper-alert dissection of the mind’s irrational insistence on establishing
a story of existential purposefulness. Both Kundera and Bering emphasize the ineluctability of our drive to discern and decipher existential
meaning (even when we suspect rationally that there is none). But Bering’s EToM model is value-free: in his account, the human brain has an
adaptive, evolved mind reading capacity (ToM) that has expanded from
a system of inferring meaning from behavior into a system of inferring
meaning in autobiographical events. The EToM model does not predict
anything further about the variety of disembodied psychological agents
held responsible for events (gods, superstitions, ideological premises),
nor can it assess the impact of EToM attributions on the regulation of
human affairs.
Kundera’s novel transcends the explanatory capacity of the universal,
evolutionary paradigm precisely where it engages the problem of moral
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value and individual responsibility: is it really all the same to whom or
to what imagined force we attribute the patterns of meaning we discern
in our lives? Does the fabric of society come apart—or mend itself—
differently if people believe that God, rather than the Dialectical Laws
of History, is responsible for scripting the events that befall them? The
Joke insists on asking these questions in a way that denies us a happy
ending. Just at the moment when Ludvik finally lets go of his bitterness
to reconnect with the native Moravian folk music of his youth (warning:
constructions of “native” are always a myth!), his friend Jaroslav is felled
by a heart attack. Kundera ends his novel with a blaze of ambulance
lights that forebodes the continuing spiritual (and perhaps physical)
paralysis of the main characters.
The parts of The Joke narrated in Jaroslav’s voice show that he has clung
to a myth that is rapidly corroding in the oxygenated atmosphere of skepticism and rebellion of 1960s Czechoslovakia. Jaroslav has constructed
his acquiescence with socialism and his personal existential narrative
on the basis of ancient folk beliefs. Soviet ideology officially celebrated
all manner of local folk customs as a way of bolstering the supposed
affinity between Communism and the prelapsarian, communal rites of
common people everywhere. Peter Steiner has explicated the structure
of Jaroslav’s utopian conservatism, which seeks to justify everything in
the present as an extension of the past. Jaroslav derives the meaning
of his existence not from God (or Historical Materialism), but from a
bond with the spirit of his people—as it is expressed specifically in the
traditions of Moravian music and folklore (Steiner, p. 200). Jaroslav
justifies his continuing support for the patently artificial, corrupted
socialist folk kitsch his younger son despises in the following terms: “I
believe things have a meaning, Vladimir. I believe the fates of men are
bonded one to the other by the cement of wisdom. I see a sign in the
fact that it was you they chose to be king [of an annual reenactment
procession] this year” ( Joke, p. 133).
Helena’s narrative voice reveals a different story. Helena fell in love
with the Party in the same moment that she first fell in love with a
man—for her, the attachment to socialism is purely emotional, connected to her sexual liberation as an 18-year old (in 1949) and subsequent marriage to the dashing Party activist she danced with that day.
Yet even when her husband betrays her and the rest of society has long
ceased to believe in the Party’s hollow (but repressive and authoritative)
rhetoric, Helena clings to the grand narrative of Communism because
it prevents her life from breaking in half. “I don’t want to split my life
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down the middle, I want it to be one from beginning to end” ( Joke,
p. 15). When she meets Ludvik in the mid-nineteen sixties, she readily
attributes his feigned interest in her as a sign that they were destined
to be together, because Ludvik represents in her mind an unbroken
thread to the values of her past.
Ludvik’s old friend Kostka is a Christian. For him, the workings of
universe are decipherable as coded signs from God, and if one attends
to the meaning of His messages, life makes sense. In the first part
of his life, it was easy enough for Kostka to elide the contradictions
between his Christian faith and his support for the socialist movement.
Communist doctrine spoke of radical equality and the end of injustice
in ways that echoed strongly with the message of the Gospels, even
if the identity of the external guiding agent was not longer God, but
Historical Materialism. By the time Kostka meets Ludvik again fifteen
years later, cracks have appeared in his faith, but he still holds onto it
with the tenacity of an articulate interpreter of our EToM: “If we hear
the voice of Christ’s appeal, we must follow it unconditionally. This is
clear from the Gospel, but in modern times it sounds like a fairy tale.
What does an appeal mean in our prosaic lives? And yet the voice of
the appeal can reach us even in today’s world if our hearing is keen”
(p. 212). Thus, when Kostka is persecuted for his religious beliefs and
pushed out of his prestigious university lectureship by the new socialist
ideologists in the 1950s, he accepts his demotion to advisor on an outof-the-way state farm as “a coded appeal.” In this way, he hypocritically
translates the reality of defeat and avoidance into a message from the
external agent who invests his life with meaning.
The Joke’s fifth protagonist, Lucie, remains mute throughout the
novel, and critics have remained mute about Lucie.14 It turns out that
the “ordinary girl” who so fiercely resisted Ludvik’s advances was not a
nineteen year old virgin. Rather, she had been the victim of frequent
gang rape by a pack of boys from the age of sixteen until she was sent
off to a reformatory at the age of seventeen. What Ludvik had loved
about Lucie when he was a conscript was the fact that she seemed so far
from the political ideologies that had twisted his fate: “she knew nothing of history, she lived beneath it; it held no attraction for her, it was
alien to her; she knew nothing of great and contemporary concerns; she
lived for small and eternal concerns” (p. 72). That Lucie’s young life had
already been broken by a different kind of trauma is of course outside
of Ludvik’s imagination. The difference between Lucie’s trauma and
that of the others is not that hers is “personal” and theirs is “political,”
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rather, it has to do with Lucie’s inability to represent or articulate any
kind of possible intentionality in her fate.
As we have seen, the novelty of Bering’s theory is that it inverts the
notion that Man is made in the image of God. On the contrary, if we have
an evolved EToM, then God (and other divinities, whatever one may call
them) is simply the name we give to the way our brain functions when
we employ our EToM. In this sense, which lacks any anthropocentric
hubris, what we call God is more nearly an image of what evolved as an
innate human function. Bering doubts our ability to willfully overcome
the cognitive drive to read intentionality into the universe. “Individuals may well be ideological atheists, and I do not doubt their sincerity
on the matter, however, much as solipsists cannot switch off theory of
mind mechanisms, neither can EToM be totally disengaged” (Bering,
p. 19). In other words, the skeptics and existentialists may be right, but
our adaptive brain architecture will not easily allow their philosophy to
inhabit its cognitive system. We might describe this as a gap between the
way the brain works and the way the mind works. This particular gap
is particularly evident when we have to do with instances of historical
and personal trauma. Our EToM kicks into gear, supplying a religious
(God wills it), or nondescript agent (historical necessity, fate, secret pattern of the universe) as the author responsible for this arrangement of
events. But what happens in response to severe trauma, defined as an
event which defies representation, which cannot be put into words, or
even re-imagined? Annie Rogers has defined the essence of trauma as a
complete failure of representation—it can’t be named.15 In this case, our
EToM comes up against a countervailing cognitive arsenal of responses
to trauma: shutting down, denial, deflection, refusal of memory, inability
to fathom the intentionality of the world so construed. This is what has
happened to Lucie: she is the one character in the novel whose normal,
cognitive capacity has shut down; her existential theory of mind has been
shattered. She exists only as a mute foil to the other narrators’ orgies of
meaning-making throughout the novel. In particular, her helplessness
as a rape victim contrasts with Ludvik’s determination to get revenge
on his former political enemies.
We will indulge in another evolutionary theory to shed light on the
meaning of Ludvik’s utterly unsuccessful revenge. In an essay for the
New Yorker, Jared Diamond suggests that basic human instinct urges us
towards personal vengeance.16 While Diamond is quick to endorse modern judicial procedures instead, he uses the story of his New Guinean
informant to show us that the thirst for vengeance is a basic human
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emotion, whose satisfaction we deny and circumvent to the detriment
of our individual psyches. Diamond’s essay belongs to the wider genre
of popular evolutionary psychology. Its purpose is to show us how our
evolved brains really work, in order to better understand how we might
soothe our souls. He believes that if we acknowledge the thirst for vengeance as a biological given, we will perhaps find ways to make amends
for the personal suffering entailed when one’s loss is not avenged.
Ludvik’s story of personal vengeance complicates the evolutionary
view of human nature presented by Diamond, because it engages our
EToM as a competing, perhaps equally powerful evolutionary drive.
When the opportunity arises, Ludvik sadistically seduces Helena, in
order to get back at her husband Zemanek, the man who orchestrated
the kangaroo court that arrested him many years ago. In a scene that
seems to function as the antipode to Jared Diamond’s story in the New
Yorker, Ludvik discovers all the reasons that personal vengeance turns
out to be deeply unsatisfying. Far from hurting Helena’s philandering
husband, he actually does him a favor. Moreover, after treating the naïve
Helena badly, he feels depressed and sullied by his own participation
in the violence he meant to avenge. Worst of all, since time has moved
forward, his old nemesis is no longer the same person. “I recognized
the Zemanek I had known; but [his] content staggered me; it was evident
that he had completely abandoned his former views, and if he and I
were now to frequent the same circles, in any conflict I would, like it
or not, find myself taking his side” (p. 271).
Faced with the futility of vengeance, Kundera’s protagonist finally
concludes that the past can only be forgotten;
Yes, suddenly I saw it clearly: most people deceive themselves with a pair
of faiths: they believe in eternal memory (of people, things, deeds, nations)
and in redressibility (of deeds, mistakes, sins, wrongs). Both are false faiths.
In reality the opposite is true: everything will be forgotten and nothing
will be redressed. The task of obtaining redress (by vengeance or by forgiveness) will be taken over by forgetting. No one will redress the wrongs
that have been done, but all wrongs will be forgotten. (p. 294)

This is a strong statement, coming from a narrator whose meta-literary
commentary about his own meaning-making processes has struck us as
unusually astute for most of the novel. Suddenly he determines that any
act of vengeance is always already too late (the processes of forgetting
and re-interpreting have already taken hold), and that all we can do is
resign ourselves to anesthesia of time.
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This is amoral. If he abandons himself to the “vertigo” of forgetfulness,
he is not just letting go of old grudges, he is also letting go of his barely
acknowledged guilt and complicity in the Communist Party’s robust initial spree in the halls of academia (where Ludvik was an activist-student).
Thus, the novel’s ethical compass does not come to rest on Ludvik, or
on any of the other characters. Rather, it rests on The Joke’s unusual and
in some ways prescient aesthetic discovery: a curious, clinical appraisal
(whether scientific or aesthetic) of our uniquely human drive to infer
existential meaning is the one thing that can best contribute to our
understanding of trauma and the possibility of adequate reparation.
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